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Abstract—We study the problem of identifying infection
sources in a network based on the network topology, and a
subset of infection timestamps. In the case of a single infection
source in a tree network, we derive the maximum likelihood
estimator of the source and the unknown diffusion parameters.
We then introduce a new heuristic involving an optimization
over a parametrized family of Gromov matrices to develop a
single source estimation algorithm for general graphs. Compared
with the breadth-first search tree heuristic commonly adopted
in the literature, simulations demonstrate that our approach
achieves better estimation accuracy than several other bench-
mark algorithms, even though these require more information
like the diffusion parameters. We next develop a multiple sources
estimation algorithm for general graphs, which first partitions the
graph into source candidate clusters, and then applies our single
source estimation algorithm to each cluster. We show that if the
graph is a tree, then each source candidate cluster contains at
least one source. Simulations using synthetic and real networks,
and experiments using real-world data suggest that our proposed
algorithms are able to estimate the true infection source(s) to
within a small number of hops with a small portion of the
infection timestamps being observed.
Index Terms—Infection source, rumor source, single source es-
timation, multiple sources estimation, diffusion process, infection
timestamps, Gromov product
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks such as Facebook, Twitter and Sina
Weibo have grown immensely in recent decades. A rumor or
piece of news can be shared and forwarded with high speed
through friendship circles [1]. Similar propagation phenomena
in complex networks are ubiquitous in nature and modern
society. For example, viruses propagate throughout the Internet
and infect millions of computers or mobile phones [2], [3].
Disease epidemics can quickly spread in human society [4],
[5]. We regard such rumors, viruses and epidemics as infec-
tions, and the propagation initiated by an infection source can
be modeled using a diffusion or infection process in networks
[5], [6]. Such infections may incur massive losses to society
[7], [8]. In view of this, it is often important to be able to
accurately and promptly identify the infection sources, so that
proper control measures can be adopted. In this paper, we
consider the infection source estimation problem based on
knowledge of the network topology, and a subset of infection
timestamps.
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A. Related Works
Several works have tackled the problem of infection source
estimation under different assumptions. Many of these works
are based on the knowledge of network topology and the
infection status of a portion of nodes in the network. In the
literature, various spreading models have been proposed in-
cluding the Susceptible-Infected (SI) [9], Susceptible-Infected-
Recovered (SIR) [10], and Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible
(SIS) [11] models. Specifically, in the SI model, an infected
node remains infected forever; in the SIR model, it can recover
and cannot be further infected; and in the SIS model, a
recovered node can become infected again. A rumor centrality
estimator under the SI model was developed in [9], [12],
while [13]–[16] developed estimators for identifying multiple
infection sources under the SI model. The paper [17] considers
infection source estimation when only a subset of infected
nodes are observed. In [18], multiple observations of a SI
spreading process are used for source estimation. In [10] and
[19], the problem of infection source estimation is investigated
under the SIR model, and [11] considers the SIS model. All the
aforementioned works perform source estimation based on the
observed status of the nodes, and the network topology. Other
related works assume additionally a priori knowledge like the
infection spreading rate, including [20] which performs source
inference via belief propagation, and [21] which developed a
dynamic message passing algorithm. Recently, [22] considered
the alternative Independent Cascade (IC) model for infection
spreading, and proposed the Short-Fat Tree (SFT) algorithm
for source identification under the IC model. The reference
[23] developed a framework for optimal source estimation
in arbitrary weighted networks with arbitrary distribution of
sources by combining controllability theory and compressive
sensing. The reference [24] considered the case where ad-
ditional relative information about the infection times of a
fraction of node pairs is also available. Finally, the works
[25], [26] have studied the complementary problem of source
obfuscation and proposed messaging protocols which can
spread the infection as widely as possible while protecting
the anonymity of the source.
Infection source estimation has also been investigated using
infection timestamps. In this framework, we make use of
observations of the first infection times of a subset of nodes
in the network. In [27], an algorithm based on the maxi-
mum likelihood estimator (MLE) is proposed. Two ranking
algorithms using a modified breadth-first search (BFS) tree
heuristic for general graphs have been proposed in [28], which
demonstrate improved estimation accuracy compared to the
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2algorithm in [27]. In [29], a two-stage algorithm was proposed
to locate a single source in large networks. The reference
[30] proposed a sequential source estimation algorithm that
allows online update of the source estimate as timestamps
are observed sequentially. In [31], a time-reversal backward
spreading (TRBS) algorithm was proposed to infer a single
source in a weighted network. The papers [32], [33] discuss
the selection of observer nodes under the deterministic slotted
SI model, so as to achieve low probability of error detection.
The problem of multiple sources estimation with infection
timestamps is less studied. In [34], a backward diffusion based
method was proposed. However, the paper assumes that all
infection sources initiate diffusion at the same start time, and
the mean of the infection propagation delays along all edges
and the number of sources are known. Such assumptions can
be restrictive for practical applications.
B. Our Contributions
We first study the single source estimation problem with
less assumptions compared with the works [27], [29], [30].
Similar to [27], [29], [30], we assume that the propagation
delay along each edge can be modeled using a Gaussian
distribution. However, unlike these references, the diffusion
parameters, including the mean and variance of the infection
propagation delay, are assumed to be unknown. When the
graph is a tree, we derive the optimal MLE that simultaneously
estimates the source and diffusion parameters. It is common in
the literature [9], [27], [29], [35] to use a breadth-first search
(BFS) tree heuristic to generalize an algorithm for identifying
a single source in a tree to one for a general graph: for each
node in the general graph, one constructs a BFS tree and
assumes that any infection starting at this node diffuses along
this BFS tree. In this paper, we introduce a novel heuristic,
which involves finding an optimal convex combination of two
BFS trees and a target covariance matrix (cf. Section III-B)
for each node to approximate the diffusion process better,
before generalizing our algorithm for trees to general graphs.
We call this the Gromov Single Source Identification (GSSI)
algorithm. Simulation results demonstrate that GSSI performs
better than algorithms proposed in [27], [31] although GSSI
requires less information.
We also study the case of multiple sources and propose
a Source Candidate Clustering and Estimation (SCCE) algo-
rithm, which makes less assumptions compared with the work
[34] as we do not assume that infection sources have the
same diffusion parameters, and the number of sources is also
unknown a priori. SCCE can be divided into two steps. In the
first step, we reduce the multiple sources estimation problem
to the single source estimation problem by partitioning the
graph into source candidate clusters. We show that if the graph
is a tree, then each cluster contains at least one source. We
then apply a procedure to estimate the number of sources
in each cluster and estimate the infection region of each
source. In the second step, we apply the GSSI algorithm in
each region. Simulation results demonstrate that our approach
performs better than the algorithm proposed in [34], and is
able to accurately infer multiple sources with a small portion
of timestamps.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we formulate the infection source estimation problem
and provide an interpretation based on Gromov matrices. In
Section III, we first derive the MLE for estimating a single
source in a tree, and then present our GSSI algorithm using
Gromov matrices for identifying a source in a general graph.
Simulations on both synthetic and real-world networks are
also provided to compare the performance of GSSI with
various other algorithms in the literature. In Section IV, we
investigate the problem of multiple sources estimation, present
our SCCE algorithm, and provide simulation results to verify
its performance. Section V concludes the paper.
Notations: We use N (µ, σ2) to denote the Gaussian distri-
bution with mean µ and variance σ2, and T N (µ, σ2) to denote
the corresponding truncated Gaussian distribution in which the
distribution support is constrained to be non-negative. We use
Exp(λ) to denote the exponential distribution with rate λ. For
a set X , its cardinality is given by |X|. Given a matrix A,
we use [A]i,j to denote its (i, j)-th entry. We write A′ for the
transpose of A, A−1 for its inverse, tr(A) for its trace, and
det A for its determinant. For two nodes u and v in a tree,
we let [u, v] denote the path from u to v, (u, v] the path with
the end node u excluded, and so on. E [·] is the expectation
operator. The symbol ∼ means equality in distribution.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We model the network as an undirected graph G = (V,E),
where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. Suppose
a collection of infection sources S = {s1, ..., s|S|} ⊂ V
initiate a diffusion process at unknown start times on G. The
infection propagates from an infected node to its neighbors
stochastically along the edges connecting them. Let τuv be the
random propagation delay associated with the edge connecting
nodes u and v. For example, if u is first infected at time
tu, then the infection propagating from u reaches v at time
tu + τuv . Similar to [27], [29], [30], we assume that the
propagation delays {τuv} for all pairs of adjacent nodes
u, v are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) con-
tinuous random variables that follow a Gaussian distribution
N (µ, σ2).1 However, we also assume that the parameters
(µ, σ2) are unknown, and need to be estimated.
We assume the diffusion follows the SI model: any infected
node never recovers. Suppose that we observe a collection of
infected nodes V = {v1, . . . , vn}, which is a subset of all
the infected nodes, and the vector of their associated infection
timestamps T = [t1, ..., tn]′. Our goal is to estimate S using
(V,T). To simplify our exposition and avoid non-invertible
matrices in our cost functions in (2), (3) and (9), we assume
that S ∩ V = ∅. There is no loss of generality making this
assumption since one can generalize our methods by adding
an additional step in which each vertex in V is considered a
potential source candidate, computing an appropriate variant
of the respective cost functions in (2), (3) and (9) for these
potential source nodes, and then choosing the node from
1The Gaussian distribution is adopted for technical convenience although its
realizations are not necessarily positive. In our simulations, we will generate
the propagation delays using a truncated Gaussian distribution instead.
3amongst V and that estimated by our method with the lowest
cost to be the final estimate.
In this paper, we consider both the single source (|S|= 1)
and multiple sources (|S|> 1) estimation problems. In the case
where |S|> 1, we assume that |S| is unknown.
A. A Gromov Matrix Interpretation
For two vertices u, v in a tree T ⊂ G, let dT (u, v) be the
length of the unique path between u and v (assuming each
edge has length 1). For a node s of T , the Gromov product
(Definition 2.6 of [36]) of u and v in T with respect to (w.r.t.)
s is given by
(u, v)s =
1
2
(dT (u, s) + dT (v, s)− dT (u, v)). (1)
The following lemma summarizes some simple properties of
the Gromov product.
Lemma 1. Let s, u and v be nodes of a tree T .
(i) If u = v, then (u, v)s = dT (u, s).
(ii) (·, ·)s is symmetric and non-negative.
(iii) (u, v)s = 0 if and only if s is on the unique path [u, v].
(iv) (u, v)s ≤ dT (u, s).
Proof: Both claim (i) and claim (ii) follow immediately
from definition (and the triangle inequality). For claim (iii),
(u, v)s = 0 if and only if dT (u, s) + dT (v, s) = dT (u, v). On
a tree, this happens only when s ∈ [u, v]. Claim (iv) clearly
holds if (u, v)s = 0. If (u, v)s > 0, from claim (iii), there
exists a vertex w ∈ [u, v] such that [u, s]∩ [u, v] = [u,w] and
[v, s] ∩ [u, v] = [v, w]. Then,
(u, v)s =
1
2
(dT (u,w) + dT (w, s) + dT (v, w) + dT (w, s)
− dT (u,w)− dT (w, v))
= dT (w, s)
≤ dT (u, s),
and the proof is complete.
Let U = {u1, . . . , un} ⊂ V be a subset of vertices of G,
s /∈ U be a vertex of G, and T be a tree that spans U∪{s} (i.e.,
U ∪{s} is a subset of the vertex set of T ). We define an n×n
matrix Λ whose (i, j)-th entry is the Gromov product (ui, uj)s
in T . We call Λ the Gromov matrix with base (T, s, U), where
T is known as its base tree and s its base vertex.
Recall that two trees T1 and T2 are said to be isometric
to each other if there is a bijection φ : T1 → T2 such that
dT1(u, v) = dT2(φ(u), φ(v)) for any u, v ∈ T1. The map φ
is called an isometry. We say that the two basis (T1, s1, U1)
and (T2, s2, U2) are isometrically equivalent to each other if
there is an isometry φ : T1 → T2 such that φ(s1) = s2 and
φ(U1) = U2.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Λ is a Gromov matrix, then
its base (T, s, U) is uniquely determined, up to isometric
equivalence.
Proof: We assume that (T1, s1, U1) and (T2, s2, U2) are
two basis of Λ. We prove that they are isometrically equivalent
to each other by induction on |U1|= |U2|. The statement is
clearly true if |U1|= 1. Indeed, the condition that Ti spans Ui∪
{si}, for i = 1, 2 imply that both T1 and T2 are simple paths,
with end points si, and the single vertex in Ui, respectively.
Therefore, (T1, s1, U1) and (T2, s2, U2) are equivalent as T1
and T2 have the same length given by Λ (which is a 1 × 1
matrix).
Suppose the statement holds for |U1|= |U2|= n. Consider
the case where |U1|= |U2|= n+1. Let Λ′ be the n×n upper-
left block of Λ. Since Λ is a Gromov matrix, so is Λ′. For
each i = 1, 2, there is a subset U ′i ⊂ Ui with |U ′i |= n, and
T ′i ⊂ Ti such that (T ′i , si, U ′i) is a base of Λ′. By the induction
hypothesis, (T ′i , si, U
′
i), i = 1, 2 are equivalent to each other
via an isometry φ′ : T ′1 → T ′2. Without loss of generality,
for i = 1, 2, let Ui = {ui,k : k = 1, . . . , n + 1} such that
φ′(u1,k) = u2,k, for k = 1, . . . , n.
Let 1 ≤ j ≤ n be an index such that the (j, n+ 1)-th entry
[Λ]j,n+1 of Λ satisfy [Λ]j,n+1 ≥ [Λ]k,n+1 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
From Lemma 1(iv), for each i = 1, 2, let wi be the unique
vertex on the path from ui,j to si such that dT ′i (wi, si) =
[Λ]j,n+1. As φ′ is an isometry and φ′(s1) = s2, φ′(u1,j) =
u2,j , we have φ′(w1) = w2.
We claim that the path [ui,n+1, si] in Ti satisfies
[ui,n+1, s1] ∩ T ′i = [wi, si]. To see this, by the choice of wi,
we have
[wi, si] = [ui,n+1, si] ∩ [ui,j , si] ⊂ [ui,n+1, si] ∩ T ′i .
On the other hand, the maximality on [Λ]j,n+1 implies that
[ui,n+1, si] ∩ T ′i cannot be a path longer than [wi, si]. Hence,
we have [ui,n+1, si] ∩ T ′i = [wi, si].
Therefore, (Ti\T ′i )∪ {wi} = [wi, ui,n+1] for both i = 1, 2.
Moreover, both [w1, u1,n+1] and [w2, u2,n+1] are of the same
length [Λ]n+1,n+1 − [Λ]j,n+1. Therefore, φ′ can be extended
to an isometry φ : T1 → T2 such that φ(u1,n+1) = u2,n+1.
The induction is now complete and the proposition is proved.
For a base (T, s, U), as the ordering of the vertices in the set
U is not fixed, its Gromov matrix Λ is determined uniquely
up to conjugation by permutation matrices of size |U |. With
this observation and Proposition 1, we conclude that Λ gives
the same amount of information as (T, s, U). Now we can
describe a reformulation of the problem and the basic idea of
our approach.
Since the propagation delays along each edge are continuous
random variables, with probability one, the infection diffusion
on a graph from a source s forms a propagation path that is
a spanning tree of all the nodes infected by s. Therefore, in
the source inference task, in addition to the source s, we are
implicitly required to find a T in the set of spanning subtrees
in G of the observed infected set V rooted at s. If G is a tree,
the source s uniquely determines T . However, in a general
graph, there may be more than one subtree rooted at s that
spans the observed infected nodes. Therefore, finding (s, T )
together is no longer equivalent to finding s alone.
In a dense graph, it is usually intractable to identify all
possible s and spanning subtrees rooted at s. On the other
hand, the results in this section imply that to identify s and
the infection propagation tree T is equivalent to estimating the
Gromov matrix associated with the infection diffusion process.
4In this paper, we formulate the source estimation problem as
an optimization of a cost function of a parametrized Gromov
matrix and the diffusion parameters (µ, σ2). By optimizing
over a parametrized family of Gromov matrices, we overcome
the intractability of identifying all possible Gromov matrices
or infection propagation paths. However, the base tree of
the optimal Gromov matrix found may not correspond to
an actual subtree in G. Our proposed approach is therefore
a heuristic in the case of general graphs. A widely used
heuristic in the source inference literature [9], [27], [29], [35]
for general graphs is the BFS heuristic, which assumes that
the infection propagation path is a BFS tree, which means
that the infection is spread from a source to each observed
infected node along a minimum-length path. However, this
approximation has many limitations. For example, in general
there exists more than one BFS tree rooted at a node, and
the BFS heuristic typically chooses only one BFS tree [9],
[27], [29], [35]. Furthermore, the actual infection tree is not
likely to be a BFS tree, especially when the graph is dense
or σ2/µ is large. In our Gromov matrix approach, some BFS
trees are included in the family of Gromov matrices that we
optimize over. Therefore, our method is expected to achieve
better performance than the BFS heuristic.
III. SINGLE SOURCE ESTIMATION
In this section, we consider the single source case, i.e.,
S = {s1}. We first derive an MLE that simultaneously es-
timates the source and diffusion parameters when the network
is a tree. We then describe our source estimation approach
using Gromov matrices for general graphs. Finally, simulations
on both synthetic and real-world networks are provided to
compare the performance of our proposed algorithm with
several other timestamp based source estimation algorithms
in the literature.
A. Preliminaries
We first consider the special case where G is a tree. Recall
that V = {v1, . . . , vn} is a set of observed infected nodes
with corresponding infection timestamps T = [t1, . . . , tn]′.
Suppose that s1 is the source node. Let t0 be the time the
source node starts its infection spreading. Then, it is easy
to see that the infection time of each node vk ∈ V is
tk ∼ N (t0+dG(s1, vk)µ, dG(s1, vk)σ2), since all propagation
delays {τuv} are i.i.d. N (µ, σ2) variables. The covariance of
ti and tj is [Λs1 ]i,j · σ2, with Λs1 being the Gromov matrix
with base (T, s1,V), where T is the subtree rooted at s1 that
spans V . The likelihood of observing the infection times T is
then given by
p(T | s1, t0, µ, σ2) =
exp
(− 12σ2 (T−Ds1β0)′Λ−1s1 (T−Ds1β0))√
(2piσ2)n det Λs1
, (2)
where β0 = [t0, µ]′, and Ds1 is a matrix with its k-th row
being [1, dG(s1, vk)]. We have the following result.
Proposition 2. Suppose that G is a tree. Then, the MLE
(sˆ, tˆ0, µˆ, σˆ
2) = arg max p(T | s1, t0, µ, σ2) for (s1, t0, µ, σ2)
is given by
sˆ = arg min
s∈V \V
det(RsΛs/n),
[tˆ0, µˆ]
′ = βsˆ,
σˆ2 = Rsˆ/n,
(3)
where
Rs = (T−Dsβs)′Λ−1s (T−Dsβs),
βs = (D
′
sΛ
−1
s Ds)
−1D′sΛ
−1
s T.
Proof: For any estimator sˆ of s1, by maximizing (2) w.r.t.
β0 = [t0, µ]
′, the MLE of β0 is given by
βsˆ = arg min
β∈R2×1
(T−Dsˆβ)′Λ−1sˆ (T−Dsˆβ)
= (D′sˆΛ
−1
sˆ Dsˆ)
−1D′sˆΛ
−1
sˆ T.
Similarly, the MLE of σ2 is given by
σˆ2 = arg max
σ2∈R
1√
(2piσ2)n
exp
(
− Rsˆ
2σ2
)
= Rsˆ/n.
Finally, the MLE of s1 is
sˆ = arg max
s∈V \V
p(T | s,βs, σ2 = Rs/n)
= arg min
s∈V \V
det(RsΛs/n),
and the proof is complete.
The reference [27] derives the MLE of the source s1 by
assuming that (µ, σ2) are known, while Proposition 2 provides
the MLE for both the source and diffusion parameters.
B. Single Source Estimation for General Graphs
In this subsection, we consider source estimation for general
graphs. To find the MLE for the source, we need to optimize
the likelihood in (2) over all possible infection trees rooted
at each candidate source node. As discussed in Section II-A,
this is intractable due to multiple paths between each pair of
vertices. Therefore, we propose to perform the optimization
over a parameterized family of Gromov matrices as follows.
We call the following procedure GSSI, which is summarized
in Algorithm 1.
(i) For each candidate source node s, we first find two BFS
trees. Let the two corresponding Gromov matrices be Λ1s
and Λ2s. For each θ ∈ [0, 1], let
Ms(θ) = θΛ
1
s + (1− θ)Λ2s,
βs(θ) = (D
′
sM
−1
s (θ)Ds)
−1D′sM
−1
s (θ)T,
and
Rs(θ) = (T−Dsβs(θ))′M−1s (θ)(T−Dsβs(θ)).
We find
θs = arg min
θ∈[0,1]
det (Rs(θ)Ms(θ)/n), (4)
5and let Ms , Ms(θs).
(ii) We introduce a target covariance matrix Hs, which is
chosen to be
Hs , msIn or Hs , diag(Ms), (5)
where ms = tr(Ms)/n, In is the identity matrix with
dimension n, and diag(Ms) is the diagonal matrix with
[diag(Ms)]i,i = [Ms]i,i. This yields tr(Hs) = tr(Ms).
For each α ∈ [0, 1], let
As(α) = αHs + (1− α)Ms, (6)
β˜s(α) = (D
′
sA
−1
s (α)Ds)
−1D′sA
−1
s (α)T, (7)
and
R˜s(α) = (T−Dsβ˜s(α))′A−1s (α)(T−Dsβ˜s(α)).
We find
αs = arg min
α∈[0,1]
det (Rs(α)As(α)/n), (8)
and let As , As(αs).
(iii) We define our estimator (sˆ, tˆ0, µˆ, σˆ2) for (s1, t0, µ, σ2)
as
sˆ = arg min
s∈V \V
det(Rs(αs)As/n),
[tˆ0, µˆ]
′ = β˜sˆ(αsˆ),
σˆ2 = R˜sˆ(αsˆ)/n.
(9)
Steps (i) and (ii) above essentially construct a Gromov
matrix to approximate the infection diffusion path starting
at a node s, based on the observed infection timestamps T.
In step (ii), we let the new Gromov matrix As be a convex
combination of Ms and a predefined invertible target matrix
Hs as shown in (6). This construction is in the same spirit as
the Stein-type shrinkage covariance matrix estimator proposed
in [37], [38], which is used to overcome the ill-conditioning
problem of the sample covariance matrix. If Ms in (6) is
replaced with the sample covariance matrix, then As(α) is
the Stein-type covariance estimator, which can be written as
a convex combination of the sample covariance matrix and a
predefined invertible target matrix Hs. Two commonly used
Hs are shown in (5). The parameter α is known as the
shrinkage intensity, whose optimization can be found in works
such as [37], [38]. In step (ii), we borrow the same idea;
the difference is that we obtain the parameter αs by solving
the optimization problem in (8). In this heuristic, the Gromov
matrix As obtained in step (ii) may not correspond to an actual
subtree of G. However, in certain important special cases,
for example, where either Hs or Ms is diagonal, then As
corresponds to a subtree of G.
Forming convex combinations allows us to systematically
approximate the Gromov matrices of spanning trees of G. In
step (i), we propose to find the two BFS trees in opposite
search directions: We first index the nodes from 1 to |V |.
Then we construct one BFS tree by prioritizing nodes with
smaller indices, and another BFS tree by prioritizing nodes
with bigger indices. Choosing BFS trees labeled in opposite
directions may give us very distinct spanning trees; and hence
Fig. 1: In this example, red nodes are the sources, blue nodes are the observed
nodes. The Gromov matrices of the two trees on the left and middle areM1
andM2, respectively. The convex combinationM3 = (M1+M2)/2 is the
Gromov matrix of the tree on the right.
we obtain a large family of Gromov matrices by taking convex
combinations. We illustrate the geometric intuition by a simple
example as in Fig. 1.
We now give an interpretation of step (ii). When the graph
is dense and the variance of the infection propagation delay
is large, the spreading paths from the source to the observed
infected nodes can be approximately regarded as uncorrelated
(i.e., the spanning tree is a star tree). Therefore α in (6) indi-
cates how far the spanning tree is from a star tree.Intuitively,
if the graph is denser, then αs1 is greater, which is validated
by the simulation results in Fig. 7 of Section III-D. To demon-
strate that step (ii) improves our estimation performance, we
present simulations in Section III-D where we compare the
performance of GSSI with another procedure that we call
naive-GSSI, which omits step (ii) and replaces As in step (iii)
with Ms.
In step (iii), the proposed estimator is simply the MLE
assuming that As is the Gromov matrix of the underlying
infection tree.
For each node in V \V we need to find two of their BFS
trees, which can be computed with time complexity O(|V |2).2
The optimization problems in (4) and (8) do not have an-
alytical solutions. We utilize standard iterative techniques
like gradient descent to solve them, which require a time
complexity of O(|V|3), assuming that the maximum number of
iterations used is fixed. The overall time complexity of GSSI
is then O(|V |(|V |2+|V|3)) = O(|V |3+|V ||V|3). To compare
with other algorithms, the time complexity of TRBS proposed
in [31] is O(|V||V |2); and the time complexity of the method
proposed in [27] is O(|V |3+|V ||V|3) (note that |V | matrix
inverses are required in [27], each incurring a time complexity
of O(|V|3)), assuming that the diffusion parameters are known
a priori.
C. Discussion
In the GSSI algorithm, if G is a tree then we do not
need to optimize θ because Λ1s = Λ
2
s, but in this case,
GSSI is not equivalent to MLE due to the introduction of
the parameter αs and target matrix Hs. However, simulations
2We say that f(N) = O(g(N)) if f(N)/g(N) ≤ k for some fixed k > 0
as N →∞.
6Algorithm 1 Gromov Single Source Identification (GSSI)
Input: Adjacency matrix of the graph G, V = {v1, . . . , vn}
and T = [t1, . . . , tn]′.
Output: (sˆ, tˆ0, µˆ, σˆ2)
1: Let fm =∞.
2: for every s ∈ V \V do
3: Find two BFS trees rooted at s in opposite search
directions to obtain Λ1s and Λ
2
s.
4: Find θs according to (4) to obtain Ms.
5: Find αs according to (8) to obtain As.
6: Compute fs = det(Rs(αs)As/n).
7: if fs ≤ fm then
8: Set fm = fs, and sˆ = s.
9: end if
10: end for
11: Set (tˆ0, µˆ, σˆ2) according to (9).
in Section III-D indicate that the introduction of αs and Hs
does not unreasonably impair our estimation results in trees,
while the introduction of the additional step in (8) leads to
better performance for general graphs.
Simulations in Section III-D suggest that when G is a tree,
then with high probability the MLE in Proposition 2 and GSSI
give the same source estimates, and αsˆ obtained by GSSI is
close to 0, which implies that the performance of GSSI is
close to the MLE when the graph is a tree. We provide some
theoretical results in Appendix A that indicate why this is true.
D. Simulations for Single Source Estimation
In this subsection, we present simulation results on both
synthetic and real networks to compare the performance of
GSSI with the MLE in Proposition 2, the TRBS algorithm
proposed in [31], and the method proposed in [27], which we
call the GAU algorithm. We note that both the TRBS and
GAU algorithms require prior knowledge of the mean and/or
variance of the propagation delay along each graph edge, while
our approach estimates these parameters from the observed
timestamps.
We first perform simulations on two kinds of random trees.
Starting from one node, we add a new node in every step
and attach it to one of the existing nodes with probabilities
proportional to their degrees to obtain a scale-free tree, or
attach the new node to one of the existing nodes randomly to
obtain a non-scale-free tree. We call these the Barabási-Albert
(B-A) tree and Erdo˝s-Rényi (E-R) tree, respectively. We denote
B-A trees as BA(N) and E-R trees as ER(N), where N is
the number of nodes. Some properties like the diameter and
average pairwise distance are listed in Table I. Our simulations
indicate that choosing Hs = msIn or diag(Ms) in (5) does
not lead to much difference in the performance of GSSI.
Therefore, here we only present the results for Hs = msIn.
For each simulation, we randomly pick a node from the
network to be the source. We simulate the propagation de-
lays along each edge using a truncated Gaussian distribution
T N (2, 1), and randomly choose a subset of nodes as observed
nodes. We perform 300 simulation runs. The error distance is
Graph |E|/|V | Diameter Average pairwisedistance
ER(500) 1.00 20 9.23
BA(500) 1.00 15 6.40
ER(500, 4) 1.98 11 4.69
BA(500, 4) 1.99 7 3.82
ER(500, 16) 8.12 4 2.54
BA(500, 16) 7.88 4 2.46
Enron 9.86 9 3.32
Facebook 25.9 9 2.95
Twitter 5.21 10 3.41
TABLE I: Some graph properties of the networks used in our simulations.
defined as the distance between the estimated source and the
real source. All four algorithms rank all the nodes in the graph
according to their likelihood of being the source. Following
[28], we define γ%-accuracy as the proportion of simulations
in which the real sources are ranked in the top γ percent of
all the nodes.
Simulation results are shown in Fig. 2. We only consider
the case where the fraction of timestamps is less than 50%.
Simulations indicate that the performance of GSSI is very
close to the MLE when G is a tree, which means that the
introduction of parameter αs and target matrix Hs in (6) does
not unreasonably impair our estimation results when G is a
tree. We observe that GSSI performs no worse than GAU
in almost all cases, and better than TRBS for both kinds of
random trees although GSSI requires less information. The
reason why GAU performs worse than GSSI in most cases
is because the simulated propagation delays are generated
using a truncated Gaussian distribution instead of the Gaussian
distribution assumed by GAU. Although GSSI also assumes a
Gaussian distribution, it estimates the distribution parameters
from the observed data, which help to mitigate this mismatch.
TRBS has the worst performance because it does not utilize
any variance information. For GSSI, we compute the mean
squared error (MSE) of the estimates µˆ and σˆ2 w.r.t. µ = 2
and σ2 = 1 respectively in Fig. 3, which show that the MSE
of GSSI is very close to that of the MLE.
We next perform simulations on general B-A graphs
BA(N,Np) proposed in [39] and E-R graphs ER(N,Np)
proposed in [40], where N is the number of nodes, and Np
is the expected degree of each node. B-A graphs are scale-
free while E-R graphs are not. We choose N = 500, and
Np = 4 and 16 to simulate graphs with different densities.
We also test on two real networks including the Enron email
network3 and a Facebook network4 provided by SNAP. For the
Enron email network, we extract a subgraph with 670 nodes
and 3303 edges, and for the Facebook network, we extract a
subgraph with 1034 nodes and 26749 edges. See Table I for
some graph properties. To demonstrate that the introduction
of the parameters θs, αs and Hs can improve performance,
we also compare GSSI with two additional algorithms which
we call BFS-MLE and naive-GSSI. For BFS-MLE we simply
3https://snap.stanford.edu/data/email-Enron.html
4https://snap.stanford.edu/data/egonets-Facebook.html
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) ER(500)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) ER(500)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) BA(500)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(d) BA(500)
Fig. 2: Single source estimation on ER(500) and BA(500).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: MSE of µˆ and σˆ2 obtained by MLE and GSSI.
use the BFS-tree heuristic: For each node s ∈ V \V , we find
a BFS tree rooted at s and then perform MLE to compute
gs , det(RsΛs/n) from Proposition 2. Finally, we minimize
gs over s ∈ V \V to obtain the source estimate. For the
naive-GSSI, we follow the same procedure as GSSI, but
only optimize θs in (4), and let αs = 0. Simulation results
are shown in Figs. 4 to 6. The plots show that in almost
all the cases, GSSI performs best and achieves significant
improvement over BFS-MLE, while naive-GSSI also performs
better than BFS-MLE. Therefore, we see that the introduction
of θs, αs and Hs in GSSI can improve estimation performance.
We also study how αsˆ in (8) varies with increasing fraction
of observed timestamps. From Fig. 7, we see that for two kinds
of random trees, the average αsˆ is very close to 0, which agrees
with the intuition provided by Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.
For B-A and E-R graphs, the average αsˆ increases as the
average degree of the graph gets larger, which is intuitively
satisfying because the actual infection propagation path can
deviate significantly from BFS trees as the graphs become
denser.
Finally, we apply our GSSI algorithm to find the source
of malware propagation in online social networks. Malware
attacks have become ubiquitous in online social networks such
as Facebook and LinkedIn [41], [42]. A successful attack using
malware in a network can result in tens of millions of accounts
being compromised and users’ computers being infected. For
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) ER(500, 4)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) ER(500, 4)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) BA(500, 4)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(d) BA(500, 4)
Fig. 4: Single source estimation on ER(500, 4) and BA(500, 4). For the
diffusion process, set (µ, σ2) = (2, 1).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) ER(500, 16)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) ER(500, 16)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) BA(500, 16)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(d) BA(500, 16)
Fig. 5: Single source estimation on ER(500, 16) and BA(500, 16), with
(µ, σ2) = (3, 1).
example, Trojan, as the most popular type of malware, is able
to steal confidential information, install ransomware and infect
other computers in the network. Therefore, it is important
to identify the sources of Trojans in order to analyse and
remove them as early as possible. There have been many works
studying the propagation of Trojans [43]–[46]. In this paper,
we adopt the propagation model in [46], which is a spatial-
temporal SIR model that takes into account the network topol-
ogy and temporal dynamics of user activities. Furthermore, it
considers characteristics of modern Trojans, security practices,
and user behaviors. Similar to the simulations in [46], we use
the Facebook network subgraph described above. Parameters
used for the propagation model are shown in Table II (see
[46] for more details). We assume that the malware is a zero-
day Trojan, which propagates fast. Therefore, it has a high
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(a) Enron network
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Enron network
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) Facebook network
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(d) Facebook network
Fig. 6: Single source estimation on two real networks, with (µ, σ2) = (3, 1).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7: Simulations to study how αsˆ varies with the fraction of observed
timestamps and for different graphs.
pi, and small qi and δi. The parameter βmax is set according
to a survey conducted by Microsoft [47]. Since GAU and
TRBS require knowledge of the mean propagation delays,
we average the infection propagation times over the edges to
obtain an estimate. Simulation results are shown in Fig. 8. The
plots show that although the propagation model violates our
Gaussian assumption, GSSI still performs best in most cases
and is able to estimate the true malware source within 1.92
hops with at least 20% infection timestamps.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8: Malware source estimation on Facebook network.
To summarize, we see that the estimation accuracy for all
algorithms is influenced by the network topology, diffusion
model and fraction of timestamps. Generally it is costly to
Parameter Description
pi = 0.8 Probability of user i following a malicious
post, unknowingly downloading the mal-
ware and executing it.
δi = 0.2 Probability of user i accepting clean-up
solutions from his non-infectious friends.
qi = 0.2 Probability of user i recovering indepen-
dently without assistance from his friends.
βmax = 0.75 Percentage of the social network popula-
tion that has anti-virus products installed
on their computers.
τi ∼ Exp(0.2) User message checking time.
TABLE II: Parameter description and setting for malware propagation model
of [46].
observe too many nodes, so we may need to estimate the
source to within a small number of hops of the real source
with a small fraction of observed timestamps. In all our
experiments, GSSI is able to estimate the source on average
to within 1.8 hops with only 30% of timestamps. A summary
comparison of GSSI w.r.t. the next best algorithm used in our
experiments when 30% timestamps are observed is provided
in Table III.
Graph Error reduction(%)
ER(500) 21.2
BA(500) 4.5
ER(500, 4) 10.4
BA(500, 4) 13.0
ER(500, 16) 38.5
BA(500, 16) 67.9
Enron 21.6
Facebook 24.8
Facebook (malware) 6.1
TABLE III: Percent of reduced average error distance GSSI compared with
the next best algorithm.
IV. MULTIPLE SOURCES ESTIMATION
In this section, we discuss the case of multiple infection
sources, i.e., |S|> 1 but unknown. We first reduce the multiple
sources estimation problem to the single source estimation
problem, which is then solved by applying GSSI. We develop
a reduction step for trees, and then extend it heuristically to
general graphs.
A. The Reduction Step for Trees
In this subsection, we consider the case where G is a
tree, and introduce the concepts of observation cluster and
source candidate cluster, which allow us to reduce the multiple
sources estimation problem to that of estimating a single
source within each cluster. Since all {τuv} are positive contin-
uous random variables, the observed timestamps are distinct
with probability one. The following definitions are illustrated
in Fig. 9.
9Definition 1. A node vk ∈ V is called observable w.r.t. u ∈ V
if the following condition holds: for each pair of distinct nodes
vi, vj ∈ V ∩ [u, vk] such that vi ∈ [u, vj), then ti < tj . The
collection of observable nodes w.r.t. u is called its observation
cluster, and denoted by Vu.
Definition 2. Let u ∈ V . The collection of all nodes v ∈ V
such that Vv = Vu is denoted by Au, which is called the
source candidate cluster w.r.t. Vu.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 9: An example to illustrate the notions of observation cluster, source
candidate cluster and the SCCE algorithm.
(a) Red nodes are the sources, blue nodes are the observed nodes. Three
infection sources S = {2, 9, 13} initiate a diffusion process on the tree
shown. Suppose we observe 6 infected nodes V = {1, 4, 7, 10, 12, 14}
and their respective timestamps. For node 9, since t4 is greater than
t1, t2 and t5, the observation cluster for node 9 is V9 = {7, 10}.
Similarly, V8 = V10 = {7, 10}, and for any node u /∈ {8, 9, 10}, we
have Vu 6= {7, 10}. Therefore, the source candidate cluster w.r.t. V9
is A9 = {8, 9, 10}.
(b) In the MSR step of SCCE, we first set U = V , and obtain ξ1 =
argminvk∈U tk = 1 so that Vξ1 = V1 = {1, 4, 7, 10} and Aξ1 =
A1 = {1, 2, 3}. We next set U = U\Vξ1 = {12, 14}, and obtain
ξ2 = argminvk∈U tk = 14 with Vξ2 = V14 = {7, 10, 12, 14} and
Aξ2 = A14 = {13, 14}. We then have l = 2 observation clusters,
and the subtrees spanning Vξ1 and Vξ2 are shown in (b). Note that
Aξ1 and Aξ2 each contains at least one source, and l < |S|= 3 since
ν9 = 10 ∈ V13. This is consistent with Proposition 4.
(c) In the SSSE step of SCCE, for each subtree in (b), we first find a
maximum length path P , and define sP (w) to be the sum of the
distances between w and leaves that are closest to w compared with
other nodes in P\w . For the left subtree in (b), we find P = [1, 7]
with the maximal length 6. We have sP (w) = 1 when w ∈ {2, 3, 8},
and sP (w) = 0 when w ∈ {9, 10}. Since sP (9) is a local minimum,
we delete the edge connecting nodes 9 and 10 to obtain two subtrees as
shown in the left and middle of (c). For the right tree in (b), we have
P = [7, 14], sP (w) = 1 when w ∈ {8, 13}, and sP (w) = 0 when
w ∈ {9, 10, 12}. We delete the edge connecting nodes 9 and 10 and
obtain two subtrees as shown in the middle and right of (c).
The observation cluster Vu of u is the set of observed
infected nodes in V that can possibly be infected by u.
However, Vu may also be the observation cluster of other
nodes v 6= u. We collect all these potential source nodes into
the source candidate cluster Au. From Definitions 1 and 2,
we have the following immediate observations. For a vi ∈ V ,
since vi ∈ Vvi , the set Vvi is non-empty. Similarly, vi ∈ Avi .
Let Ism be the collection of nodes in V infected by sm ∈ S.
Specifically, if there is only one source s, then Vs = Is = V .
For any u ∈ V , let
νu , arg min
vk∈Vu
tk. (10)
We have the following results regarding Vu, Au, and Ism .
Lemma 2. Consider any node u ∈ V .
(i) If vk ∈ Vu, then for any vi ∈ [u, vk)∩V , we have vi ∈ Vu
and ti < tk.
(ii) Au∩V = {νu}. Specifically, if u = νsm for some sm ∈ S,
then Vu = Vsm (or sm ∈ Au).
(iii) Au is connected.
(iv) For each sm ∈ S, Ism ⊂ Vsm .
(v) If vk ∈ Vu, then Vvk ⊂ Vu. Specifically, if vk ∈ Ism ,
then Vvk ⊂ Vsm .
(vi) If νu ∈ Vv , then Vu ⊂ Vv .
Proof:
(i) This follows directly from Definition 1.
(ii) We first prove that for any vk ∈ V\νu then Vu 6= Vvk .
If vk /∈ Vu, then it follows directly that Vu 6= Vvk . If
vk ∈ Vu\νu, then νu /∈ Vvk because tk > t′, where t′
is the timestamp of node νu. Since νu ∈ Vu, we have
Vu 6= Vvk . We then prove that Vu = Vνu . If u ∈ V , then
u = νu and it follows directly that Vu = Vνu . We next
consider the case where u /∈ V . Suppose vk ∈ Vu\νu.
According to claim (i), we find vi ∈ Vu such that vi ∈
[u, vk] and [u, vi] ∩ V = vi. By the minimality condition
(10), [u, νu] ∩ V = {νu}. Then we have [νu, vi] ∩ V =
{νu, vi} and t′ < ti, thus vi ∈ Vνu ; and moreover vk ∈
Vνu from Definition 1. Suppose on the contrary vk /∈ Vu.
Then from Definition 1, there exists a pair of distinct
nodes vi, vj ∈ V ∩ [u, vk] such that vi ∈ [u, vj). As a
consequence, ti > tj . Since [u, νu]∩V = {νu}, we have
vi ∈ [νu, vj); and hence vk /∈ Vνu . Therefore Vu = Vνu .
(iii) According to claim (ii), it is equivalent to prove Aνu is
connected. We now prove that for any vk ∈ V , Avk is
connected. From claim (ii) we have Avk ∩ V = {vk}.
Therefore given u ∈ Avk\vk, we have u /∈ V . We show
that (vk, u) ∩ V = ∅. Suppose on the contrary that there
exists vi ∈ V and vi ∈ (vk, u). According to claim (i),
since vk ∈ Vu then vi ∈ Vu and ti < tk. Then we must
have vi /∈ Vvk which contradicts Vu = Vvk . Therefore for
any v ∈ (vk, u) we have [u, v] ∩ V = ∅, then it is easy
to see that Vu = Vv = Vvk thus v ∈ Avk . Therefore the
claim of connectedness holds.
(iv) If vk ∈ Ism , then we have [sm, vk] ∩ V ⊂ Ism . As the
propagation delay over each edge is positive, it is easy to
verify that vk ∈ Vsm from Definition 1.
(v) We prove that if vi ∈ Vu and vj ∈ Vvi , then vj ∈ Vu.
From Definition 1, for each pair va, vb ∈ [u, vi]∩V such
that va ∈ [u, vb], we have ta ≤ tb ≤ ti. If vj ∈ Vvi then
for each pair vc, vd ∈ [vi, vj ] ∩ V such that vc ∈ [vi, vd],
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we have ti ≤ tc ≤ td. So we have [u, vi]∩ [vi, vj ]∩V =
vi, and then for each pair vp, vq ∈ [u, vj ] ∩ V such that
vp ∈ [u, vq], we have tp ≤ tq . This implies that vj ∈ Vu.
Specifically, if vk ∈ Ism , then vk ∈ Vsm thus Vvk ⊂ Vsm .
(vi) According to claim (ii) and claim (v), if w = νu ∈ Vv ,
then Vu = Vw ⊂ Vv . Specifically, if νsi ∈ Vsj , then
Vsi ⊂ Vsj .
From Lemma 2(iv), we see that the set of observed nodes
Ism infected by sm, is a subset of Vsm . Therefore Vsm can
be used as an approximation of Ism . We provide a procedure
to approximate {Vsm : sm ∈ S} in the following.
For a given vi ∈ V , our aim is to develop a method to
efficiently generate Avi . Starting from the root vi, we perform
BFS, with the search path stopping immediately before hit-
ting any node in V\{vi}. Let B(vi,V) be the collection of
discovered nodes in this tree.
Proposition 3. For any vi ∈ V , Avi ⊂ B(vi,V). If vi /∈ Vvj
for any vj ∈ V\{vi}, then Avi = B(vi,V).
Proof: According to the proof of Lemma 2(iii), it is easy
to see that if u ∈ Avi , then u ∈ B(vi,V). Given the condition
vi /∈ Vvj for any vj ∈ V\vi, we prove that if u ∈ B(vi,V)
then u ∈ Vvi . According to Lemma 2(ii), it is equivalent to
prove νu = vi. Suppose on the contrary νu = vk and vk 6= vi.
Then [u, vk]∩V = vk. Since u ∈ B(vi,V) then [u, vi]∩V = vi
and vi ∈ Vu. So we have [vi, vk] ∩ V = {vi, vk} and tk < ti.
Therefore vi ∈ Vvk ; and we obtain a contradiction. Then we
must have νu = vi and u ∈ Vvi , which completes the proof.
We now introduce the notion of an admissible covering of
V .
Definition 3. A covering that decomposes V = ⋃li=1 Ui into
a union (not necessarily disjoint) of non-empty subsets Ui for
1 ≤ i ≤ l, is called admissible if for each i, and there exists
ui such that Vui = Ui.
It is easy to see that {Vsm}|S|m=1 is an admissible covering of
V . However, since the sources are unknown, we propose the
Multiple Sources Reduction (MSR) algorithm in Algorithm 2
to find an admissible covering. We have the following result.
Algorithm 2 Multiple Sources Reduction (MSR)
Input: Adjacency matrix of the tree G, observations V =
{v1, . . . , vn} and T = [t1, . . . , tn]′.
Output: {Vξi}li=1 and {Aξi}li=1.
1: Let U = V , and i = 1.
2: while U 6= ∅ do
3: ξi = arg minvk∈U tk.
4: Find Vξi according to Definition 1, then find Aξi =
B(ξi,V) (cf. Proposition 4(i)).
5: Set l = i, i = i+ 1, U = U\Vξi .
6: end while
Proposition 4. Consider the the MSR algorithm in Algo-
rithm 2.
(i) For each i = 1, . . . , l, Aξi = B(ξi,V).
(ii) {Vξi}li=1 is an admissible covering of V .
(iii) Each Aξi contains at least one source, so l ≤ |S|. If
l = |S|, then each Aξi contains exactly one source.
(iv) l = |S| if and only if for each distinct pair si, sj ∈ S,
νsi /∈ Vsj .
Proof:
(i) Since ξi = arg minvk∈U tk, for any vj ∈ U\{ξi}, we
have ξi /∈ Vvj . Suppose there exists vj ∈ V\U such
that ξi ∈ Vvj . Since vj ∈ Vξk for some k < i, from
Lemma 2(v), Vvj ⊂ Vξk and we obtain a contradiction
with ξi /∈ U . The claim then follows from Proposition 3.
(ii) It follows directly that each Vξi is non-empty and V =⋃l
i=1 Vξi with l ≤ |V|.
(iii) If ξ1 ∈ Vs1 , then ξ1 = νs1 . According to Lemma 2(ii),
s1 ∈ Aξ1 . If U 6= ∅ and suppose ξi ∈ Vsi , then from
Lemma 2(vi), we must have νsi /∈
⋃i−1
j=1 Vξj . Therefore
νsi = ξi and si ∈ Aξi . This procedure is then repeated
and each Aξi contains at least one source. Moreover, it
is likely that some sources are not contained in any Aξi .
Refer to the example in Fig. 10. So l ≤ |S|. If l = |S|,
then each Aξi contains exactly one source.
(iv) By the proof of claim (iii), if for each distinct pair si, sj ∈
S such that νsi /∈ Vsj , then we can find {ξm}|S|m=1 with
ξm = νsm . On the contrary, if there exists νsi ∈ Vsj
then νsj < νsi , so we must choose νsj before νsi . From
Lemma 2(vi), Vsi ⊂ Vsj thus Vsi ∩ U\Vsj = ∅. Hence
si ∈ Aνsj (cf. Fig. 10(a)) or si will not be contained at
any {Aξk}lk=1 (cf. Fig. 10(b)). This implies that l < |S|.
(a) (b)
Fig. 10: Two cases where l < |S|. The observed infected nodes are labeled
with their infection timestamps, and |S|= 2. Since ξ1 = v1 = νs1 andVξ1 = V then we have l = 1 < |S|= 2 and νs2 ∈ Vs1 . In (a), Aξ1 ={s1, s2, v1}. In (b), Aξ1 = {s1, v1}.
Finding ξi in Algorithm 2 can be accomplished by maintain-
ing a min-heap for T, which incurs an overall time complexity
of O(|V|) for the whole algorithm. Finding Aξi involves
BFS, which incurs a time complexity of O(|V \∪k<iAξk |).
Therefore, the overall time complexity of MSR is O(|V |).
Proposition 4(iii) indicates that if we assume that there is
only a single source in each source candidate cluster Aξi , then
we are underestimating the number of sources (see Fig. 10
for an example). Therefore we adopt an additional procedure
developed in [48] to further partition each Aξi and Vξi . The
paper [48] has proposed an algorithm, which we call the
Source-Set Size Estimation (SSSE) algorithm, to estimate the
number of infection sources in a tree by partitioning the tree
into several covering components. We briefly summarize the
SSSE algorithm in Algorithm 3.
The time complexity of SSSE is O(|V |). From Lemma 2(iii)
we see that each Aξi forms a connected subtree. So we apply
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Algorithm 3 Source-Set Size Estimation (SSSE) [48]
Input: Adjacency matrix of the tree T .
Output: A set of disjoint and connected subtrees of T ,
denoted by {Ti}Ki=1.
1: Compute the average pairwise distance d¯ of T , and find
a path P = [u, v] with the maximal length.
2: if |P |> d¯ then
3: Define a function sP (·) on P : For each w ∈ P , find
the leaves (with degree 1) in T that are closest to w
compared with other nodes in P\w. Then sP (w) is
defined to be the sum of the distances between w and
each of these leaves. If sP (w) is a local minimum
and w′ is a neighbor of w in P , then delete the edge
connecting w and w′. T is divided into two subtrees T1
and T2.
4: end if
5: For T1 and T2, repeat the above partition procedure until
the diameters of the subtrees are less than d¯ or sP (·) does
not have a local minimum.
the SSSE algorithm on each Aξi to obtain a new covering for
V , which are denoted by {Ci}Li=1, where L ≥ l. At the same
time {Vξi}li=1 is also partitioned as {Oi}Li=1. Our simulations
indicate that it is now possible for L > |S| as SSSE may
over-estimate the number of sources in each Aξi .
Finally, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ L, we apply GSSI to find a source
estimate sˆi ∈ Ci using Oi as an approximation for Isi . Note
that different sources may have different diffusion parameters
(t0, µ, σ
2) and GSSI is able to estimate these parameters
for each possible source. An example to illustrate the steps
involved in the estimation of multiple sources on a tree is
given in Fig. 9.
B. Multiple Sources Estimation for General Graphs
We now heuristically extend the sources estimation proce-
dure for trees described in the previous subsection to general
graphs, and summarized it in Algorithm 4, where {sˆi}Li=1
is the set of estimated sources. First, we make use of the
BFS heuristic in generalizing the MSR algorithm to a general
graph before applying SSSE. Notice that for general graphs,
it is possible that before applying the SSSE algorithm, the
number of source candidate clusters l > |S| and Aξi ∩ S = ∅
for some values of i. The generalized MSR and SSSE steps
involve a time complexity of O(|V |2) since we find BFS trees
rooted at each ξi. For each subgraph we run GSSI, whose
time complexity depends on the number of nodes and observed
nodes of the subgraph. The worst case complexity is incurred
when L = 1. Therefore the overall time complexity of SCCE
is O(|V |3+|V ||V|3).
C. Experimental Evaluations for Multiple Sources Estimation
We evaluate the performance of our SCCE algorithm with
the same graphs used in Section III-D. We compare SCCE
with the method proposed in [34], which we call the BDSL
algorithm. To quantify the performance of SCCE and BDSL,
we adopt the performance metric (with a slight modification
Algorithm 4 Source Candidate Clustering and Estimation
(SCCE)
Input: Adjacency matrix of the graph G, observation V =
{v1, . . . , vn} and T = [t1, . . . , tn]′.
Output: Sˆ = {sˆi}Li=1
1: Let U = V , and i = 1
2: while U 6= ∅ do
3: ξi = arg minvk∈U tk.
4: Find one BFS tree rooted at ξi and then obtain B(ξi,V)
and Vξi on this tree. Set Aξi = B(ξi,V).
5: Set l = i, i = i+ 1, U = U\Vξi .
6: end while
7: For each 1 ≤ i ≤ l, run SSSE algorithm to partition Vξi
and Aξi on the BFS tree rooted at ξi. Finally we obtain
{Ci}Li=1 and {Oi}Li=1.
8: for every Ci and Oi do
9: Run GSSI algorithm. Compute fs in line 6 of Algo-
rithm 1 for each s ∈ Ci\{ξi}.
10: Pick sˆi to be a node s that minimizes fs.
11: end for
for fairer comparison) proposed in [13]: We first match the
estimated sources {sˆi}Li=1 with the actual sources {si}|S|i=1 so
that the sum of the error distances between each estimated
source and its match is minimized. Denote this matching as
pi. If we incorrectly estimate the number of infection sources,
i.e., L 6= |S|, we add a penalty η||S|−L|. Denote dmax and
d as the diameter and average pairwise distance of the graph.
Since the distance between a source and a random node does
not exceed dmax, a reasonable choice of penalty η ≤ dmax. We
then define the average error to be
∆ =
1
L
min(L,|S|)∑
i=1
d(si, sˆpi(i)) + η||S|−L|
 , (11)
where d(u, v) is the length of the shortest path in G between
u and v, and
L =
{
min(L, |S|) if η = 0,
max(L, |S|) if 0 < η ≤ dmax.
For different applications, we may assign different values
to η depending on how important it is to estimate correctly
the number of infection sources. In this paper, we consider
η = 0, d and the extreme case where η = dmax. The BDSL
algorithm cannot estimate the number of sources, so we
assume it has prior knowledge of |S|. Therefore for BDSL,
we have L = L = |S|.
We first perform simulations on ER(500) and BA(500). For
each simulation, we let the number of sources be uniformly
chosen from {2, 3, 4}. From Proposition 4(iv), we see that if
two sources are close to each other, then it is likely that one
of them cannot be identified. So we choose sources such that
the distance between each pair of sources is no less than the
average pairwise distance of the tree, which is a reasonable
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Fig. 11: Multiple sources estimation on (a) BA(500) and (b) ER(500).
assumption in real applications.5 For the diffusion process,
let the start times of all sources be identical, which is an
assumption required by BDSL, and propagation delays along
all edges follow a truncated Gaussian distribution N (2, 1).
Notice that BDSL requires to know the mean of the Gaussian
distribution used while our algorithm does not. For the BDSL
algorithm, since we uniformly choose |S| from {2, 3, 4}, the
average L is 3, which is used as a benchmark to compare how
well SCCE performs in estimating the number of sources. We
randomly choose a portion of nodes as observed nodes for the
multiple sources estimation. We average ∆ in (11), and L over
300 simulations and plot against the fraction of timestamps as
shown in Fig. 11. The plots in Figs. 11(a) and 11(b) show
that SCCE performs better than BDSL for both B-A and E-
R trees although SCCE requires less information. For SCCE
algorithm, from Fig. 11(c) we see that L > |S| in some cases
due to the introduction of the additional partition procedure
developed in the SSSE algorithm; and the average L is close
to the average |S| if we observe enough timestamps.
We next perform simulations on some synthetic graphs and
real networks (cf. Table I for some properties of these graphs).
Let the number of sources be uniformly chosen from {2, 3},
so that its average value is 2.5. For the truncated Gaussian
distribution used to simulate the infection spreading, we set
(µ, σ2) = (3, 1). Since in real applications, |S| is typically
not very large, we make the additional assumption that |S|≤ 5
when running the SCCE algorithm by controlling the number
of iterations in the MSR step. Simulation results in Figs. 12
to 14 indicate that in terms of average ∆, SCCE performs
5Note that no estimation method can find all the sources correctly with
probability one. Therefore, in real applications, source estimation methods
are used to narrow down the potential candidate sources so that further
investigation on them and their neighbors within a small radius can be
conducted. Sources that are close to each other can then be considered as
a single source under our estimation framework.
best in the cases where η = 0 and d. In most cases SCCE
also performs better than BDSL even when η = dmax. For the
performance of average L, we see that generally SCCE finds
more source estimates as the fraction of timestamps increases.
Sometimes we may over-estimate the number of sources. On
E-R and B-A graphs, SCCE is able to find estimates that are
on average within 2 hops of the real sources when the fraction
of timestamps is at least 20%. For the Enron and Facebook
networks, BDSL has poor estimation accuracy, while in the
case of η ≤ d, SCCE produce estimates that are on average
within 2.5 hops of the real sources with no less than 30% of
nodes being observed.
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Fig. 12: Multiple sources estimation on (a) BA(500, 16) and (b) ER(500, 16).
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(b)
Fig. 13: Multiple sources estimation on (a) Enron network and (b) Facebook
network.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 14: Performance of the average L for different graphs.
We also apply our algorithm to estimate multiple sources
in malware propagation using the model and parameters dis-
cussed in Section III-D. We randomly and uniformly choose
2 or 3 malware sources and collect infection timestamps.
Simulation results are shown in Fig. 15. The plots show
that BDSL performs poorly even with increasing fraction
of timestamps; we believe this is because the estimation of
the mean propagation delays are not accurate. For SCCE, if
the penalty η dose not exceed d, we are able to estimate
sources that have an average error of 2.5 even with only 10%
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timestamps. The performance does not improve much as the
fraction of timestamps increases. We believe this is because
the diffusion model we have assumed does not match the
characteristics of malware propagation.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 15: Malware sources estimation on Facebook network.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of SCCE with a
sample of real data provided by SNAP.6 First developed in the
work [49], the Higgs dataset has been built after monitoring
the spreading processes on Twitter before, during and after
the announcement of the discovery of a new particle with the
features of the elusive Higgs boson on 4 July 2012. Before
the announcement on 1 July 2012, there were some rumors
about the discovery of a Higgs-like boson at Tevatron. Such
rumors were posted on the Twitter social network and quickly
spread among Twitter users around the world. The dataset
provides a social network with 456,626 users and 14,855,842
connections. In addition, a retweet network including the
users and timestamps of retweet events is also given. We
extract a connected sub-network with 5,078 users and 26,449
connections. All the users in this sub-network posted or
retweeted the rumors related to the Higgs boson discovery.
We also collect 4,254 users’ first retweet timestamps and the
total spanned time is about 39 hours starting from 1 July 2012.
We then model the sub-network as an undirected graph (cf.
Table I), regard the timestamps as our observations, and the
first several users who posted the rumors independently as
infection sources.
The diffusion of the retweets is heterogeneous and unknown
to us, which means that our assumptions for the diffusion
model are not satisfied. However, we still apply our SCCE
algorithm to estimate the sources given the graph topology and
timestamp observations. Algorithms such as GAU and BDSL
require more information such as the mean of the propagation
delays, which need to be learned from historical data. From the
dataset we find three infection sources, let S = {s1, s2, s3}. In
the extracted graph we have d(s1, s2) = 2, d(s2, s3) = 2, and
d(s1, s3) = 3. These three infection sources have different
start times. We observe that s1 first initiated the diffusion
process, then after about 7 and 15 hours, s2 and s3 started their
diffusion, respectively. We then randomly choose a fraction
of timestamps to perform multiple sources estimation using
SCCE. After obtaining the estimated sources, we compute
the average ∆ and average L to show its performance. To
test the BDSL algorithm, we learn the mean time of a tweet
spreading across an edge from 50,000 historical tweets, which
yields an estimate of about 4 hours. We average over 50
6https://snap.stanford.edu/data/higgs-twitter.html
experiments. The comparison between SCCE and BDSL is
shown in Table IV. We see that SCCE performs well on this
real data. Comparatively, BDSL has poorer accuracy since the
start times of the sources differ significantly from each other,
and the mean propagation delays are not accurately known.
The average number of estimated sources L obtained by SCCE
is 2.2 with 10% timestamps, 3.1 with 20% timestamps and 3.3
with 30% timestamps.
Fraction of
timestamps
Average ∆
SCCE SCCE SCCE BDSL
(η = 0) (η = d) (η = dmax)
10% 0.73 1.88 3.2 5.6
20% 1.10 1.72 1.92 5.3
30% 0.96 1.68 1.89 5.4
TABLE IV: Comparison between SCCE and BDSL on real data.
To summarize, with the same fraction of timestamps, the
performance of multiple sources estimation is not as good
as single source estimation. This makes sense as the number
of timestamps used for each source estimation is reduced.
A summary comparison of SCCE (with η = d and dmax)
with BDSL when 30% timestamps are observed is provided
in Table V.
Graph Error reduction(%)
η = d η = dmax
ER(500) 61.2 46.9
BA(500) 54.4 40.4
ER(500, 16) 34.4 14.1
BA(500, 16) 27.8 5.2
Enron 47.8 18.1
Facebook 45.6 12.0
Facebook (Malware) 49.5 43.8
Twitter 68.9 65.0
TABLE V: Percent of reduced average error distance of SCCE compared with
BDSL.
V. CONCLUSION
We have developed algorithms to estimate infection sources
using a subset of timestamps for the cases where there is
a single source, and where there are multiple sources and
the number of sources is unknown. We adopt a Gaussian
spreading model with unknown diffusion parameters, which
are estimated as part of our inference algorithms. In the single
source case, we introduce a new heuristic that optimizes over
a parametrized family of Gromov matrices to more accurately
identify the source in a general graph. In the multiple sources
estimation problem, we develop theory that allows us to
partition the observed infected nodes into observation clusters.
We then apply our single source algorithm in each cluster.
Experimental evaluations with synthetic and real-world data
suggest that our approaches can find the infection sources to
within a small number of hops from the true sources with a
small number of timestamp observations.
The works [25], [26] have developed infection strategies
that make it difficult for a network administrator to estimate
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the infection source accurately. These works assume that the
network administrator has access only to the infection status
of each node, but not the infection timestamps. With infection
timestamps, it becomes more difficult to obfuscate the identity
of the source. Since our approach involves estimation of
the diffusion parameters and can handle model mismatch to
some extent, as shown in our simulations on malware source
estimation, we expect our approach to be somewhat robust
to obfuscation strategies. Designing good source obfuscation
strategies when timestamp information is available, and cor-
responding source estimation strategies to counter them are
potential interesting future research directions.
APPENDIX A
HEURISTIC ANALYSIS OF GSSI
Suppose that the estimates by GSSI (sˆ, [tˆ0, µˆ]′, σˆ2) =
(s1,β0, σ
2), the true parameter values. Then, αsˆ = αs1 in
(8) is the solution of the following optimization problem:
αs1 = arg max
α∈[0,1]
p(T | s1, t0, µ, σ, α)
= arg max
α∈[0,1]
exp
(− 12σ2 U′A−1s1 (α)U)√
(2piσ2)n det As1(α)
= arg min
α∈[0,1]
f(α) , log det As1(α) +
1
σ2
U′A−1s1 (α)U,
where U = T −Ds1β0 and As1(α) = αHs1 + (1 − α)Λs1
according to (6). Let f1(α) = log det As1(α) and f2(α) =
U′A−1s1 (α)U so that f(α) = f1(α) + f2(α)/σ
2. Our goal is
to show that on average, f(0) is close to a local optimum
when G is a tree, since αsˆ = 0 makes GSSI equivalent to
MLE.
Lemma A.1. Suppose that G is a tree, and the GSSI estimates
(sˆ, [tˆ0, µˆ]
′, σˆ2) = (s1,β0, σ2). Then, we have
(i) f1(α) is concave and non-decreasing for α ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) f2(α) is convex w.r.t. α and ddαf2(α)
∣∣∣
α=0
≥
U′Λ−1s1 U(1 − λmax(Λ−1s1 Hs1)), where λmax(·) is the
largest eigenvalue of its matrix argument.
(iii) E
[
d
dαf(α)
∣∣∣
α=0
]
= 0.
Proof:
(i) The first and second derivatives of f1(α) w.r.t. α are given
by
d
dα
f1(α) =
1
det As1(α)
d
dα
det As1(α)
= tr(A−1s1 (α)
d
dα
As1(α))
= tr(A−1s1 (α)(Hs1 −Λs1)), (12)
and
d2
dα2
f1(α) = tr(−A−1s1 (α)
d
dα
As1(α)A
−1
s1 (α)
· (Hs1 −Λs1))
= tr(−A−1s1 (α)(Hs1 −Λs1)A−1s1 (α)
· (Hs1 −Λs1))
≤ 0.
Hence f1(α) is concave. We also have
d
dα
f1(α)
∣∣∣
α=1
= tr(H−1s1 (Hs1 −Λs1))
= n− tr(H−1s1 Λs1)
= n−
n∑
i=1
[Λs1 ]i,i/[Hs1 ]i,i
= 0,
therefore ddαf1(α) ≥ 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) We have
d
dα
f2(α) = −U′A−1s1 (α)
d
dα
As1(α)A
−1
s1 (α)U
= −U′A−1s1 (α)(Hs1 −Λs1)A−1s1 (α)U, (13)
and
d2f2
dα2
(α) = 2U′A−1s1 (α)
d
dα
As1(α)A
−1
s1 (α)
· (Hs1 −Λs1)A−1s1 (α)U
= 2[U′A−1s1 (α)(Hs1 −Λs1)]A−1s1 (α)
· [(Hs1 −Λs1)A−1s1 (α)U]
≥ 0,
where the last inequality holds because As1(α) is positive
semidefinite. Therefore, f2(α) is convex.
To show the lower bound, we have
d
dα
f2(α)
∣∣∣
α=0
= U′Λ−1s1 U−U′Λ−1s1 Hs1Λ−1s1 U.
Let W = H
1
2
s1Λ
− 12
s1 and u = Λ
− 12
s1 U. Let σmax(W) be
the spectral norm of W, then we obtain from Theorem
5.2.7 of [50],
σ2max(W) = sup
x6=0
x′W′Wx
x′x
≥ u
′W′Wu
u′u
=
U′Λ−1s1 Hs1Λ
−1
s1 U
U′Λ−1s1 U
,
and U′Λ−1s1 Hs1Λ
−1
s1 U ≤ σ2max(H
1
2
s1Λ
− 12
s1 )U
′Λ−1s1 U.
Since σ2max(W) = λmax(WW
′), we have
d
dα
f2(α)
∣∣∣
α=0
≥ U′Λ−1s1 U(1− λmax(Λ−1s1 Hs1)),
since H
1
2
s1Λ
−1
s1 H
1
2
s1 and Λ−1s1 Hs1 have the same eigenval-
ues.
(iii) From (2), we have T ∼ N (Ds1β0, σ2Λs1) so
1
σΛ
− 12
s1 U ∼ N (0, In), and 1σ2 U′Λ−1s1 U follows a chi-
squared distribution with n degrees of freedom. From
(12) and (13), we obtain
E
[
d
dα
f(α)
∣∣∣
α=0
]
= tr(Λ−1s1 (Hs1 −Λs1))
+
1
σ2
E
[
U′Λ−1s1 U
]
− 1
σ2
E
[
U′Λ−1s1 Hs1Λ
−1
s1 U
]
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= tr(Λ−1s1 Hs1)− n+ n
− tr(Λ− 12s1 Hs1Λ−
1
2
s1 )
=0,
and the proof is complete.
Lemma A.1(iii) says that on average the first derivative of
f(α) is zero at α = 0, which implies that αs1 cannot be much
larger than zero with high probability.
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